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Essay
The Emerging Genre of The Constitution:
Kent Newmyer and the Heroic Age
MARY SARAH BILDER
In written celebration of Kent Newmyer’s intellectual and collegial influence,
this Essay argues that the written constitution was an emerging genre in
1787-1789. Discussions of the Constitution and constitutional interpretation often
rest on a set of assumptions about the Constitution that arose in the years and
decades after the Constitutional Convention. The most significant one involves the
belief that a fixed written document was drafted in 1787 intended in our modern
sense as A Constitution. This fundamental assumption is historically inaccurate.
The following reflections of a constitutionalist first lay out the argument for
considering the Constitution as an emerging genre and then turn to Kent
Newmyer’s important influence. The Essay argues that the constitution as a system
or frame of government and the instrument were not quite one and the same. This
distinction helps to make sense of ten puzzling aspects of the framing era.
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The Emerging Genre of The Constitution:
Kent Newmyer and the Heroic Age
MARY SARAH BILDER *
In written celebration of Kent Newmyer’s intellectual and collegial
influence, this Essay argues that the written constitution was an emerging
genre in 1787-1789. Discussions of the Constitution and constitutional
interpretation often rest on a set of assumptions about the Constitution that
arose in the years and decades after the Constitutional Convention. The
most significant one involves the belief that a fixed written document was
drafted in 1787 intended in our modern sense as A Constitution. This
fundamental assumption is historically inaccurate. The following
reflections of a constitutionalist first lay out the argument for considering
the Constitution as an emerging genre and then turn to Kent Newmyer’s
important influence.
***
At the outset, let me be honest . . . in the dark hours of the night, I have
considered converting to originalism. The appeal is undeniable. I love
history and think that history is relevant to constitutional interpretation. I
have written about what people of the framing generation thought about
words and concepts—and I find fascinating the tracing of etymologies and
lexicographies.1 I am happy puzzling over the details of the Constitutional
Convention.2 But then I think about the framing generation and the
generations that have followed—and what The Constitution is. And I can’t
do it.

*
Founders Professor, Boston College Law School. I thank Sharon O’Connor, Saul Cornell,
Michael Dorf, Jonathan Gienapp, John Mikhail, and Maeva Marcus for helpful comments. The
discussion at Northwestern’s Originalism and History: An Interdisciplinary Discussion (October 2019)
was helpful and I thank the participants, with special thanks to Jim Pfander and Mike Rappaport for the
invitation. This Essay reorders comments made at the November 8, 2019 celebration to accommodate
the form of the written essay.
1
E.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, James Madison, Law Student and Demi-Lawyer, 28 LAW & HIST. REV.
389 (2010); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006);
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913 (1997); Mary Sarah
Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61
MO. L. REV. 743 (1996).
2
E.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
10–11 (2015); Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1624 (2012).
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Because at core, I am what I call, a constitutionalist, not an originalist.3
Originalism has one foundational assumption about the Constitution. It was
(1) a written constitutional text in 1787; (2) with a fixed, knowable
meaning. As Lawrence B. Solum explains, “Originalists argue that the
meaning of the constitutional text is fixed and that it should bind
constitutional actors.”4 Whether a semantic originalist,5 an original
methods originalist,6 a positivist originalist,7 a public meanings originalist,8
3
There is not a good term to describe constitutional interpretation that contrasts to originalism.
My sense is that the frame continues to be that set by the 1985–1986 debate between Attorney General
Edwin Meese III and Justice William Brennan. See Jack N. Rakove, Introduction, in INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 3, 3–4 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990)
(discussing Attorney General Edwin Meese III’s speech in 1985 arguing for a “jurisprudence of
original intention” [originalism] and Justice William Brennan’s response three months later, defending
“the notions of constitutional interpretation” that Meese had criticized (internal quotations omitted)).
As opposed to imagining “living constitutionalism” meaning the opposite of dead constitutionalism,
the term has become used as a pejorative, primarily used to suggest untethered interpretive modes. On
the history of the term, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1255–62 (2019) (providing
history on the phrase “living constitutionalism”); David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, U. CHI.: L.
SCH. (Sept. 27, 2010), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution (excerpt of The Living
Constitution). Although David Strauss has written significantly about living constitutionalism, initially
through the lens of common law constitutionalism, reclaiming the term remains rather difficult at
present. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–5 (2010); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884–87 (1996); see also
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 558–59, 600 (2006)
(suggesting “common law originalism” as a medium between the approaches of originalism and living
constitutionalism to constitutional interpretation); David Thomas Konig, Commentary, James Madison
and Common-Law Constitutionalism, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 507, 508–12 (2010) (discussing
constitutionalism). For incisive comment on the state of contemporary constitutional scholarship, see
André LeDuc, Toward a Reflective Equilibrium: Making Our Constitutional Practice Safe for
Constitutional Theory, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 39, 40 (2018) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018) (detailing two dominant styles of
contemporary constitutional scholarship)). For recent explanations by non-originalists, see Michael C.
Dorf,
Why
Not
to
Be
an
Originalist,
DORF
ON
L.
(Nov.
14,
2019),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/11/why-not-to-be-originalist.html (noting how originalism transformed
“into a sword that could be wielded by conservatives to strike down laws adopted by liberal
lawmakers”).
4
Solum, supra note 3, at 1244. Solum delineates the core of originalist constitutional theory: (1)
the Fixation Thesis; (2) a reasonable version of the Constraint Principle; (3) “some account of the
nature of original meaning”; and (4) “they affirm (or at least do not deny) the plausibility of such other
theses as are required to render originalism plausible” (including among these that the text “is not
radically indeterminate”; that the “original meaning” is recoverable through originalist methodology;
and that constitutional actors can “comply with the Constraint Principle”). Id. at 1270–71.
5
For discussion defining semantic originalism, see, for example, the work of Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism 2 (Ill. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 07–24, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
6
For discussion defining original methods originalism, see, for example, the work of John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation
and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752–53 (2009).
7
For a discussion on positivist originalism, see, for example, the work of William Baude and
Stephen E. Sachs.
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9

or a framers intent originalist, they share the assumption that the
Constitution of 1787-1789 belonged to a genre already known to the
framing generation and which carried a set of interpretive rules.
But in 1787-1789, the Constitution was an emerging genre.
Constitution still carried with it the meaning of a system of government.
Indeed, in 1787 the Constitution was still as much a system of government
as it was a document.10 Or, to put it differently, the paper drafted in 1787
described a system of government for a new nation. When I first began to
explore this topic over a decade ago, I suggested, “[r]ather than a dramatic
step from charter to Constitution that bifurcates the colonial period from
the constitutional one, the adoption of the term ‘constitution’ was perhaps
initially a less dramatic step.”11 Although constitution was beginning to
shift towards signifying the words of the document as discrete and
severable from the embedded system of government, it would take
decades—if ever—for that transition to be complete.
There was no abrupt transformation from system of government to
Constitution. There was no sudden shift from constitution to Constitution.
The first state “constitutions” used the term interchangeably, calling
themselves “constitution or frame of government” or “constitution or form
of government.”12 In the 1780s and in the 1790s, constitution still denoted
8
The extensive originalist-influenced scholarship that draws its conclusions from writing during
the ratification period or from dictionary definitions falls into this category. See, e.g., Solum, Semantic
Originalism, supra note 5.
9
For a discussion on framers’ intent originalism, see, for example, the work of Richard S. Kay.
10
E.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J.
HORWITZ 28, 29 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009); BILDER, MADISON’S HAND,
supra note 2; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Constitution to The Constitution, in B.C. L. SCH. FAC. PAPERS
129, 139 (2018), http://works.bepress.com/mary_bilder/95/; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Ordeal and the
Constitution, 91 NEW ENG. Q. 129, 139 (2018). Modern editing conventions obscured this point. For
example, according to the standard source, Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal Convention,
George Read wrote to John Dickinson on May 21, 1787, “I am in possession of a copied draft of a
Federal system intended to be proposed.” 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
1, 24–25 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). The emphasis appeared to be Federal. The original letter, however,
stated “a copied Draft of a fœderal System.” Letter from George Read to John Dickinson (May 21,
1787), in READ FAMILY LETTERS, 1716–1787, Collection 0537 (Hist. Soc’y Pa., 2014). For discussion
of growing perception of difference between the American and British Constitutions, see MICHAEL
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 156–
57 (1986) (describing three transitions in American constitutionalism: “first, we are different (1790s
until the 1860s); second, some variations do exist but we share common constitutional roots dating
back to Magna Carta and beyond (1870s until the 1920s); and third, although both systems evolved
historically within a discernible Anglo-American framework, their most fundamental attributes make
them profoundly dissimilar (1920s and 1930s)”).
11
Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, supra note 10, at 36.
12
THE CONSTITUTION, OR FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS (Worcester, Isaiah Thomas ed., 1780); A CONSTITUTION, OR FRAME OF
GOVERNMENT, AGREED UPON BY THE DELEGATES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
MASSACHUSETTS-BAY (Boston, Benjamin Edes & Sons ed., 1780). Pennsylvania combined the
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the embedded system of government even as it was coming also to signal
the document. The process of drafting a document, arguing about it,
structuring a government according to its boundaries, and eventually
judging government actors by it, would begin to foreground the document.
Eventually, to many Americans, Constitution would come to mean only the
document. But in the 1780s and 1790s that had not yet happened. Over
three decades ago, Suzanna Sherry alluded to the gap in suggesting both
that the “American invention of the Constitution” as creating fundamental
law was “largely complete” by September 1787, and yet that Chief Justice
John Marshall transitioned to “the modern textual constitutionalists’ use of
the single written source” only late into his tenure.13 Jack Rakove similarly
incisively commented, “For since 1789 Americans have always possessed
two constitutions, not one: the formal document adopted in 1787–88, with
its amendments; and the working constitution, comprising the body of
precedents, habits, understandings, and attitudes that shape how the federal
system operates at any historical moment.”14 Abandoning the assumption
that the Constitution as a genre existed by September 1787 resolves these
apparent tensions.
What word describes what the Constitution was in the late 1780s and
1790s if it wasn’t “the Constitution” meant as a written fundamental law
document? Once one begins to carefully read sources, it becomes
remarkably difficult to figure out whether people in the late 1780s and
1790s were using the word Constitution to refer to the type of written legal
genre or to the system of government gestured at by written words.
Declaration of Rights with its Constitution, or Frame of Government, PA. CONST. (1776), available at
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp#1 (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (“[T]he following
Declaration of Rights and Frame of Government, to be the CONSTITUTION of this commonwealth . .
. .”). Virginia enacted separate Declaration of Rights and A Constitution, or Form of Government in
1776.
First
Virginia
Constitution,
June
29,
1776,
LIBR.
VA.,
https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/va_constitution (last visited
Jan. 29, 2020). North Carolina used “the Constitution, or Form of Government.” THE CONSTITUTION,
OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT, AGREED TO, AND RESOLVED UPON, BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
FREEMEN OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA (Philadelphia, F. Bailey ed., 1779). For the use of
similar title for the 1787 document, see THE CONSTITUTION OR FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Boston, Adams & Nourse eds., 1787). Into the nineteenth century, some
states continued to title the enacted document using these names. On early constitutions, see WILLI
PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980)
(1973); DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION (2012); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (rev. ed. 1998).
13
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1156–72
(1987); see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 903 (1985) (Sherry saw her article as a companion to Jefferson Powell’s important article
arguing that the framers did not expect future interpreters to look to the framers’ intent).
14
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 339–40 (1996) (Rakove continues: “The problem of originalism is about the relation
between these two constitutions”).
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Although contemporary capitalization conventions distinguish two distinct
understandings, the late eighteenth century followed different conventions.
As I noted previously, “The Federalist Papers originally appeared with
‘constitution’ consistently spelled with a small c.”15 One can imaginatively
replace Constitution with system of government or frame of government
and sentences retain their meaning and, in some instances, become more
nuanced.
Not infrequently, the framing generation used the word charter as if it
was that genre to which the document belonged. Indeed, James Madison,
so-called Father of the Constitution, referred to American constitutions as
charters in January 1792, never once describing the documents as
Constitutions.16 The cultural practice that supported the Constitution as a
written text grew out of corporate charters.17 Recently John Mikhail and
Nikolas Bowie argued for the importance of the corporate charter origins
when interpreting the Constitution.18 As I have argued elsewhere, charter
constitutionalism—the constitutional law and politics that arose under
written colonial charters—followed a different set of interpretive
conventions than the ones urged by modern textualists and originalists.19
As a case study, the famous language in the liberties assurance in the
Virginia charter demonstrated that “[t]he specific words and the underlying
concept were not in complete correspondence.”20 Jud Campbell’s
scholarship demonstrates an analogous Founding Era ambivalence about
the conceptual correspondence in his work on early First Amendment
controversies.21 Although the 1787 Constitution arose out of this long
practice of charter constitutionalism, it did not perfectly fit within the
charter genre by historical standards.
15
Bilder, Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, supra note 10, at 29 (The research
for this essay was done before the printed eighteenth century text, and many newspapers, could be
searched easily and relatively effectively. With new databases and improved search functions, this
conclusion could be explored with more nuance.); THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
16
Charters, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1792, at 94. See JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND
CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 201 (2018) (interpreting the
text of Madison’s article, “Charters”).
17
Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 504, 519–20; Mary Sarah
Bilder, English Settlement and Local Governance, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA: EARLY AMERICA (1580–1815), at 63, 66–67 (2008).
18
John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commentary
on “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution by Gary Lawson and Guy
Seidman, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 407, 423–29, 440 (2019); Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution
Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1397 (2018).
19
Mary Sarah Bilder, Charter Constitutionalism: The Myth of Edward Coke and the Virginia
Charter, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1549–53 (2016).
20
Id. at 1552; see Jonathan Gienapp, The Foreign Founding: Rights, Fixity, and the Original
Constitution, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 115, 116 (2019).
21
Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. 517, 569–70
(2019); Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 251–53 (2017).
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Joseph Story hinted at the definitional dilemma. In Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States, Story defined constitution using the
word instrument: “In our future commentaries upon the constitution, we
shall treat it, then, as it is denominated in the instrument itself, as a
CONSTITUTION of government, ordained and established by the people of
the United States for themselves and their posterity.”22
The constitution and the instrument were not quite one and the same.
The constitution was the constitution of government and that was not
precisely the same as the instrument.
Instrument is a rather nice word to use. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, the word used in law means: “A formal legal document
whereby a right is created or confirmed, or a fact recorded; a formal
writing of any kind, as an agreement, deed, charter, or record, drawn up
and executed in technical form, so as to be of legal validity.”23 A quick
glance can find the word used by favorite Founders in conjunction with the
Constitution. In an oft-cited explanation about The Federalist in 1818,
Madison noted, “The immediate object of them was to vindicate &
recommend the new Constitution to the State of N.Y. whose ratification of
the instrument, was doubtful as well as important.”24 Similarly,
Gouverneur Morris’s famous explanation about the drafting noted, “That
instrument was written by the fingers, which write this letter.”25 Instrument
captures the performative legal function of the document.26
Once we see the instrument as something apart from the Constitution,
a number of puzzling aspects of the Convention, ratification, and
subsequent history make sense. I managed to come up with ten because I
22

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 134 (1833).
Instrument, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), https://www.oed.com/oed2/
00118368.
24
Letter from James Madison to James K. Paulding (July 23, 1818), reprinted in Founders
Online, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 29, 2019), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-0102-0273. [Original source: 1 JAMES MADISON, LETTER TO JAMES K. PAULDING, in THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, RETIREMENT SERIES 309–11 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2009)].
25
Letter from Gouveneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), reprinted in 3 THE LIFE
OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERS 322, 323 (Jared Sparks ed., 1832). In a somewhat bitter letter, Morris goes on to ask,
23

But, after all, what does it signify, that men should have a written Constitution,
containing unequivocal provisions and limitations? . . . Having sworn to exercise the
powers granted, according to their true intent and meaning, they will, when they feel
a desire to go farther, avoid the shame if not the guilt of perjury, by swearing the
true intent and meaning to be, according to their comprehension, that which suits
their purpose.
Id. Morris continues to suggest “comparing the plain import of the words, with the general tenor and
object of the instrument.” Id.
26
For careful and precise use of document in discussing the Constitution, see AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).
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once saw Doris Kearns Goodwin give a ten-item talk. In this space, I will
briefly note rather than elaborate them.
1. The Convention. During the summer of 1787, the system of
government was repeatedly the point. The Convention spent most of its
time worrying about principles and structures. The delegates preferred
words that were broad, expansive, and with multiple possible meanings,
they worried about cavilers (people who would pick a narrow meaning),
and they occasionally resolved disputes by picking a word that permitted
both sides to think they had won, rather than choosing one side as right and
the other wrong.28 The rights included in the instrument related to the
system of government: the two limiting the legislature (bill of attainder and
ex post facto); the two from Magna Carta (habeas corpus, jury trial in
criminal cases); and the one that made the United States diverge radically
from Great Britain—the right to hold office and participate in government
without a religious test or a required oath.29
2. The final drafting committee. The Committee on Style was given
extensive leeway and completely rearranged the draft into seven articles
that permitted an interpretive structure to be superimposed on the system.
The formal name for the Committee was “to revise the style of and arrange
the articles.”30 Repeatedly, the Secretary referred to it as the Committee of
revision.”31 No one fussed and the Convention almost instantly approved
the instrument. The Constitution as we come to know it only begins to be
visible in this moment.32
3. The Convention’s letter. At the end of the Convention, they wrote to
Congress
describing
what
they
were
transmitting
as
“that Constitution which has appeared to us the most adviseable,” not “the

27

See, e.g., Betsy Corcoran, Doris Kearns Goodwin’s 10 Leadership Lessons from the White
House, EDSURGE (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2019-03-20-doris-kearns-goodwins-10-leadership-lessons-from-the-white-house (outlining ten leadership lessons Goodwin has learned
from “studying the minds and habits” of presidents); Carmen Forman, Doris Kearns Goodwin Reveals
Top 10 Presidential Traits at Virginia Tech, ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.roanoke.com/news/education/doris-kearns-goodwin-reveals-top-presidential-traits-atvirginia-tech/article_a0bb7a36-c06a-5cd7-abfb-ece79a694eab.html (explaining what Goodwin has
learned about leadership from her extensive research on American presidents).
28
These points can be found in greater detail in BILDER, MADISON’S HAND, supra note 2, at 127–
30.
29
See Bilder, The Ordeal and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 141 (describing the rights
included in the instrument); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Founding (1776 – 1791), in WITH LIBERTY AND
JUSTICE FOR ALL? THE CONSTITUTION IN THE CLASSROOM (Robert Cohen, Maeva Marcus & Steve
Steinbach eds., forthcoming 2021).
30
Bilder, How Bad?, supra note 2, at 1648.
31
Id.; Bilder, The Ordeal and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 141.
32
Other textual clues include the use of “establish the following Constitution” in the preamble in
the August 6 draft and “this Constitution” in the preamble of the final draft. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 260–61, 306 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976).
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33

Constitution.” More powers had been needed, and executive and judicial
authorities more “fully and effectually vested” in a general government—
but it was a bad idea to delegate that to one body of men (i.e., the old
Congress).34 “Hence results the necessity of a different organization.”35
And the Convention went on to explain that people differed but to reach
consensus, people had been “less rigid on points of inferior magnitude”
and had entered into “mutual deference and concession.”36 None of that
explanation makes sense about a document that was to be rigidly read; but
it all makes sense imagining the instrument as a constitution of a system of
government. In fact, the letter accompanied many broadside and
newspaper printings of the Constitution. Readers could read the letter and
the large-type preamble and skip the detailed instrument.37
4. Congress. The Convention was intriguingly uninterested in what
happened to the precise words of the instrument. It never decided in
advance whether Congress could revise the instrument (which Congress
decided not to do), nor what to do if states proposed revisions and
amendments. Only because the instrument passed without revision through
Congress and was subsequently ratified without revisions and
amendments, was it possible to begin to think of the instrument drafted in
1787 as particularly special.38
33
Id. at 305–06; Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 649 (1995); Bilder, The
Ordeal and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 141–43.
34
1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at
305.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 305–06.
37
See, e.g., BROADSHEET PRINTING OF THE CONSTITUTION, in PA. PACKET, & DAILY
ADVERTISER, ca. Sept. 17–18, 1787, available at https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/_/
DAEclrGkF842Lw (providing the preamble in large text at the top, the provisions in much smaller text
below, and George Washington’s letter on page 4). “We, the People of the United States, in order to
form a more perfect Union, to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
Defence, promote the General Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to Ourselves and our
Posterity . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” Dunlap and
PACKET,
&
DAILY
ADVERTISER,
Sept.
19,
1787,
Claypoole,
PA.
https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/PA_Packet1.jpg. The Independent Gazetteer published the
instrument under the heading “Plan of the New Federal Government.” Plan of the New Federal
Government, INDEP. GAZETTEER, OR, CHRON. FREEDOM., Sept. 19, 1787, at 1–3,
https://www.sethkaller.com/item/1962-21085.99-Rare-First-Printing-of-the-U.S.Constitution&from=26; A.R. Hasse, List of Books and Some Articles in Periodicals in the New York
Public Library, Relating to Political Rights, Constitutions and Constitutional Law, in 8 BULLETIN OF
THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY 103–04 (1904) (listing early printings of the U.S. Constitution in
broadsheets and elsewhere in different cities in the new United States); Robert Allen Rutland, The First
Great Newspaper Debate: The Constitutional Crisis of 1787–88, in 97 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY 43, 47 (1987) (“[I]t is probable that every one of the ninety-nine or
100 newspapers . . . provided their readers with the complete text.”).
38
BILDER, MADISON’S HAND, supra note 2, at 155; Bilder, The Ordeal and the Constitution,
supra note 10, at 143 (explaining how the founders “did not know that the Convention would be
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5. Ratification. As Bernard Bailyn pointed out, attacking the semantic
words of the instrument was the strategy of the opponents, the so-called
Anti-Federalists; the proponents—the Federalists—repeatedly defended it
according to structural principles.39 Pauline Maier noted, “Once criticism
of the Constitution mounted, its supporters had to defend sections . . .
about which, in truth, they themselves often had reservations, and they had
to make sense of the system of government it proposed in ways that went
beyond anything said or even understood at the federal Convention.”40
Although the instrument was ratified without alterations, the ratification
debate had altered the understanding of the instrument. Saul Cornell
described the arguments of the critics as those of “other founders.”41 In the
aftermath of the instrument’s drafting, a host of incompatible
interpretations arose, which were not resolved or abandoned, but rather
became part of American constitutionalism. The instrument was ratified
without resolution of conflicting interpretations.
6. The First Congress. The First Congress, as Jonathan Gienapp
persuasively argues, was characterized by extensive debates over how to
interpret the instrument.42 Madison, in particular, found the interpretive
debates fascinating. As he noted, echoing himself in Federalist 37, “the
exposition of the Constitution is frequently a copious source, and must
continue so until its meaning on all great points shall have been settled by
precedents.”43 That is, the idea that the instrument was a constitution only
began tentatively as an argument, usually for a particular political end, in
followed by public ratification. They thought it plausible—possibly even likely—that Congress would
view the Constitution as a report; debate it; revise it—and then decide what to do. . . . They did not
know that the Constitution would remain the document that they drafted”); See 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 322–53 (reproducing
Melancton Smith’s notes on the debates as “the most complete record of discussion and action in
Congress” and providing dates to the originally undated sources by using the printed Journals of
Congress).
39
BERNARD BAILYN, The Federalist Papers, in TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND
AMBIGUITIES OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 100, 100–25 (2003). As I recall, Bernard Bailyn made this
point in his class taught at Harvard Law School in the spring of 1990, perhaps based on his work on the
ratification debate pamphlets. See 1–2 BERNARD BAILYN, THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION (1993).
40
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 69
(2010).
41
SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN
AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 1–18 (1999); Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & Constitutional Meaning:
The Enduring Legacy of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 389 (2014).
42
See GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 16, at 201. For other writing focusing on the
interpretive debates in the First Congress, see Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional
Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 81 (1993); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
775, 775–76 (1994). Contemporary interest in executive power gave rise over the last decade in
extensive interest in the 1789 Congress by scholars such as Saikrishna Prakash.
43
BILDER, MADISON’S HAND, supra note 2, at 174. See id. at 172–74 (discussing more on the
First Congress debates).
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Congress. Gienapp notes that the “fixed Constitution was, thus, not
discovered but invented, as a certain form of constitutional imagination
acquired coherence and power.”44
7. The Supreme Court. The instrument did not clarify the nature of
judicial interpretation; indeed, it only said “one Supreme Court.”45 The
original Court and judiciary were under-theorized.46 The Court came into
existence with six Justices and no practice of written opinions.47 As Maeva
Marcus described, the early Court did not interpret the instrument’s words
as strictly binding; rather, it was interpreted as part of a system of
government.48 They had “remarkably similar views of the purposes” but
differences over time on “specific points of constitutional interpretation.”49
And, the logical inconsistencies of Supreme Court judicial review and
departmentalism remained for the future.50 Even in 1803, when Chief
Justice John Marshall five times insisted on the importance of the written

44

GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 16, at 324.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
46
Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or
Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY
ACT OF 1789, at 13, 13–39 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). For recent work on various influences on Article
III’s interpretation, see James E. Pfander, Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis,
66 DUKE L.J. 1493, 1535 (2017); Deirdre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The Revolutionary War Prize
Cases and the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 477, 477–78 (2015); James E.
Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2011).
47
Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall
Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1985); Charles C. Turner et al., Beginning to Write
Separately: The Origins and Development of Concurring Judicial Opinions, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93, 94
(2010); Mary Sarah Bilder, “Speaking In Writing”: Why Did American Judges Publish Written
Opinions? (unpublished job talk, 1993-1994) (on file with author).
48
See Maeva Marcus, The Effect (or Non-Effect) of Founders on the Supreme Court Bench, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1794, 1812 (2012) [hereinafter Marcus, The Effect] (“[T]he early Supreme Court
Justices . . . understood their role in . . . interpret[ing] federal law uniformly for the new nation” and
understood that “various provisions in the Constitution needed to be explained [by] time and
experience . . . .”); Maeva Marcus, The Constitution’s Court, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 373, 375–76 (2012)
(“At the Virginia ratifying convention, both Patrick Henry and Marshall specifically stated that the
judges could declare a statute unconstitutional.”).
49
Marcus, The Effect, supra note 48, at 1794.
50
On judicial review and departmentalism, see William Michael Treanor, The Case of the
Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 522–23 (1994) (stating that
judicial review is a necessary check on legislative power); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 463 n.28 (2005) (discussing various opinions on judicial
review and restraint); William Michael Treanor, Original Understanding and the Whether, Why, and
How of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218, 218–19 (2007) (stating that the power of
judicial review existed before Marbury); and the scholarship of Keith Whittington. See, e.g., Keith E.
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REV. 773, 782–83 (2002) (highlighting that the theory of departmentalism proffers that no one
“interpreter is supreme”).
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constitution, he nonetheless seemed to distinguish between the instrument
and the constitution.51
8. Placement of Amendments. The decision to add amendments rather
than to interweave them left the 1787 instrument intact. Madison assumed
the amendments would revise the instrument; Sherman suggested tacking
them on the end (which is what happened). With that decision, “the
original Constitution and the Convention that wrote it remained
significant.”52 Gienapp points out that “by supplementing rights provisions,
observers were encouraged to see the entire Constitution more as a set of
textual guarantees than as an elaborate interlocking, holistic system.”53 As
the history of the Magna Carta indicates, a repeatedly revised instrument
could have nonetheless produced a cultural fixation with the concept of
and concepts in the document, but perhaps a less stringent focus on
particular words.54
9. Effect of Amendments. And yet, the point of amendments has always
been to alter the entire system of government. The amendment process
may be analogous to republication in trusts and estates law. A codicil
updates the entire instrument by “republication” to the date of the codicil.
Indeed, a strong argument for adding the twelve amendments was to help
persuade North Carolina and Rhode Island to ratify and come into the
union.55 Every state that has entered the Union accepts the supremacy of an
instrument that meant something different in that year of admission
because of the ways that amendments and judicial and cultural
interpretations have republished the document. In 1959, when Hawaii
entered, the understanding of the Constitution was different than when
Vermont entered in 1791.56 And the “Constitution” to which they pledged
51
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 179 (1803) (“Could it be the intention of those who gave this
power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the
constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?”). See also
MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
EMPIRE 195 (2004) (counting references).
52
BILDER, MADISON’S HAND, supra note 2, at 175 (citation omitted).
53
GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION, supra note 16, at 196. Gienapp devotes a chapter to the
debate. See id. at 164–201.
54
See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Whole of the Constitutional History of England Is a Commentary
on this Charter, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1540–43 (2016) (discussing different interpretations of the text);
R. H. Helmholz, The Myth of Magna Carta Revisited, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1475, 1492–93 (2016) (stating
that the interpretative method used by Coke and Blackstone looked to the goals of the enactment rather
than simply the specific words of the statute).
55
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 592–95 (2016).
56
During questions following a keynote speech by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, entitled, “The
Methodology of Originalism” at George Washington University Law School in 2012, moderated by
John Manning, I asked about this interpretive dilemma. I referred to it as the problem of a moving wall
of ratification. My memory is that Justice Scalia responded that he believed the states came into the
union knowing that they were agreeing to a Constitution that was interpreted as it had been interpreted
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supremacy reflected an evolving history of constitutional interpretive
practices.
10. The Preamble. We the people: I believe that the Preamble creates a
consent theory on which the instrument and the Constitution as a system of
government are founded.57 “We the People of the United States” is not we
the people who signed in 1787—nor we the people who ratified it between
1787 and 1790. In old charters, the first words provided the authority of the
king. In the words of the 1662 Connecticut charter: “Charles the Second,
By the grace of God, King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland,
defender of the Faith, &c.; To all to whom[] the[se] presents shall come,
Greeting.”58 Ordain and establish was followed by a long series of words
in colonial charters that embraced laws, statutes, ordinances, and other
aspects of the system of government.
We know that the Constitution distributed power in ways to
disenfranchise, enslave, and deny rights and privileges to people who were
not white men—to African Americans, to people of color, to women. And,
that the practices of the United States government recognized members of
Native Nations as part of the people only at a point when that recognition
brought with it few rights and power. And that the last centuries have been
characterized by the appropriation of the Constitution by white men under
the claim that a white male democracy was somehow the people’s
democracy.
And yet, at the same time, the last centuries have also been the story of
the people insisting that the system of government embodied in the
Constitution be made more perfect for the people. In the instrument, We
the People of the United States—undefined by time, by race, by gender, by
citizenship—are the authority. And what do the “we” do—they “ordain
and establish this Constitution.”59 In every generation, the people, on
reading the instrument, become once again the “we” who ordain and
establish this constitution for ourselves and our posterity. The Constitution
as an instrument and system of government tilts in favor of the purposes of
the preamble and its mandate to interpret for ourselves and our posterity.
***
in 1787-1789. Jamie L. Freedman, A Supreme Visit: Visiting GW Law for the Fourth Time in Recent
Years, Justice Scalia Keynotes Law Review Symposium 48–49 (Winter 2012),
https://www2.gwu.edu/~magazine/archive/2012_law_winter/feature_pdf/GWLaw_Win12_feat2.pdf.
57
See Mikhail, supra note 18, at 429 (arguing that the Preamble vests the government “with the
implied power to fulfill every purpose for which that government was established”). For other
interpretive theories focusing on the Preamble, see Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional
Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 714, 715 (2010) (discussing the theory of preambles and their
functions); John W. Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble,
91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (2018) (arguing that the Preamble does more than set forth the
Constitution’s general aspirations and epitomizes the purposes behind the adoption of the Constitution).
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In my gradual shift towards recognition of the emerging genre of the
written Constitution, I have relied on Kent Newmyer as a constant
influence. I can’t recall when I didn’t know Kent––so I suspect that I came
to know him through my dear friend Kitty Preyer; who introduced whom is
lost in the mists of time. We both had the pleasure of collaborating with
Maeva Marcus on the collection of Kitty’s essays, Blackstone in America,
published after her death.60
When I met Kent, I was in awe of him because of his magnificent
book, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old
Republic.61 In telling the story of Justice Story, Kent had not shied away
from Story’s complexities—most importantly, Story’s tragic inability to
think about cases like Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842)62 in a way that saw
African Americans as full and equal citizens.63 Kent showed how Story
imagined his role as a statesman in a vision of the United States—the Old
Republic—that was vanishing even as Story sought to fix it through
constitutional interpretation.64 The title’s juxtaposition of Supreme Court
Justice with Statesman underscored Kent’s point: constitutional law was
irrevocably embedded in, not insulated from, American politics.65
Later, Kent would write an intellectual biography of Chief Justice John
Marshall and finally, my personal favorite, his account of the Burr treason
trial.66 He has been the consummate practitioner of the belief that the
historian’s goal is to understand how people—the biographical subjects—
constructed their world and why that construction made sense to them;
how they justified the inevitable contradictions; and, sadly, how they
persuaded themselves to look away and ignore certain questions or
injustices present around them. Without fail, Kent wrote in a confident yet
humble voice. Sentences were precise and clear. Paragraphs and sections
carefully constructed. Difficulties of analysis were explicitly confronted
and then explained.
As a kind and generous reader, Kent has a unique capacity for helping
an author understand what they are trying to communicate. In late 2013, I
was struggling with the manuscript for Madison’s Hand.67 In October, I
60
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NEWMYER, supra note 61, at 307, 358, 365–68.
64
Id. at 156.
65
See id. at 388 (discussing how Justice Story’s legal system trended consistently toward the
integration of constitutional law with other areas of the law).
66
R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT, at xvi
(2001); R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
CHARACTER WARS OF THE NEW NATION 2 (2012).
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emailed Kent a copy of, what I then called, “this awful manuscript.”68 A
month later, he mailed back comments, suggesting structurally moving the
detailed material about manuscripts to appendices—thereby saving the
reader wading through a discussion of folios and watermarks. And,
importantly, Kent helped me clearly articulate the point of the book. After
reading his comments, I wrote a new paragraph reflecting what he told me
I was saying. There, in 2013, in that exchange with Kent, was the point of
my book:
Madison . . . could not even clearly see the Constitution as a
coherent textual document. His Notes, in the form they
existed in the summer of 1787, revealed this indeterminacy.
They reflect the ways in which the politics and process of
drafting the document postponed comprehension. Madison’s
Notes were one man’s view of the writing of a constitution—
one in which we only can glimpse aspects of our
understanding of the Constitution.69
And Kent responded to a revised introduction: “You have found your
groove for sure! Keep on rollin’.”70 But I found my groove only because
Kent helped light the way. Having lived so long with Marshall, Jefferson,
Burr, and Story as they struggled to understand this emerging genre of a
written constitution, Kent recognized that Madison could not see the
Constitution as a coherent textual document.
Ever the consummate historian, Kent appreciated the perilous
connection between scholarly accounts of the founding era and
contemporary constitutional interpretative claims. He titled his Marshall
biography: the Heroic Age.71 There was an obvious duality in the title. On
the one hand, maybe he meant that the Age of Marshall was the Age of
Heroes—a time in the past when justices were truly great, and, admittedly,
there is a tad of that poignancy in the book. But the Heroic Age was also
the recognition of the creation of myth, for the Heroic Age was the name
that Hesiod gave to the period in which the great heroes of Homer lived—
from the Argonauts to the Trojan war. And in this sense, Kent was
cautioning us about the temptation to tell the story of the Framing
generation as a Heroic Age, where we replaced unsettled answers with
misleading clarity, and we turned ordinary men into demi-gods.
68
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In these words, Kent praised our mutual dear friend Kitty Preyer:
“[W]hat she willingly lets stand as the truth of history–is that for twenty
years the matter was unresolved and open for debate. Only time,
experience, and a changed political environment settled the issue.”72 Kent’s
insight has always been this truth of history—certainly the Heroic Age of
the framing—that matters were unsettled, unresolved, and open for debate.
Nowhere is this insight as relevant as in coming to understand the
unresolved and debatable genre of the Constitution itself.
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